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A CASE FOR PREEMPTION: WELLENKAMP V.
BANK OF AMERICA IS INAPPLICABLE TO FED-
ERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
INTRODUCTION
A note secured by a deed of trust on real property, or the
deed of trust instrument itself, very often includes a provision
labeled a due-on-sale clause. This clause allows the lender, at
his option, to accelerate' repayment of the debt owed by the
borrower should the borrower sell the property that secures the
underlying note
The due-on-sale provision serves an important function. It
allows the lender to adjust a lower interest rate on the original
note to current market rates, thus allowing the lender to re-loan
the funds at a more profitable rate. This adjustment can be
accomplished in one of two ways. The first requires the bor-
rower to pay back the whole amount due on the note. This
would allow new funds to be available for mortgage lending to
new borrowers at the prevailing higher rates. The second ap-
proach applies in a situation where the borrower wishes to sell
the property, and agrees with the new purchaser that the latter
should "assume" 3 the existing note and deed of trust as part
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1. To "accelerate" the debt refers to the lender's ability to call the entire amount
of the loan due before maturity.
2. The following is an example of a due-on-sale clause contained in a promissory
note of Bay View Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n:
In the event the undersigned, or any successor in interest of the under-
signed shall sell, convey, transfer, contract to sell, or lease with option to
purchase the real property described in the deed of trust securing the
note, or any part of said real property or any interest therein, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, all indebtedness secured by said deed of
trust, including the unpaid balance of principle and interest, irrespective
of the maturity dates of said indebtedness and notes evidencing the same,
shall at the option of the holder hereof and without demand or notice,
become immediately due and payable.
3. When a buyer of reil property "assumes" an existing loan secured by that
property, he agrees to become the primary debtor, and the seller no longer makes
payments. In the event of default on the loan, and a foreclosure on the property by
the lender, both the assuming buyer and the seller are liable for a deficiency should
the property not satisfy the amount of the loan still due. The lender's ability to obtain
a deficiency, however, is subject to CAL. CIV. CODE § 580b (West 1976) (no deficiency
judgment on a purchase-money mortgage), CAL. CIv. CODE § 580d (West 1976) (no
deficiency judgment after a non-judicial foreclosure), and CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726
(West 1976) (must foreclose on all the security in order to sue for a deficiency), which
limits its practice.
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of the purchase price. In this situation, the lender could raise
the interest rate as part of the assumption fee; that is, raise the
rate in lieu of exercising the due-on-sale clause and allow the
new buyer to assume the loan.
The California Supreme Court, in its landmark
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America4 decision, has declared that
due-on-sale clauses may no longer be exercised for interest ad-
justment purposes. The Welenkamp court held that the only
valid use of the due-on-sale clause exists where sale of the
property by the borrower would impair the lender's security.'
Use of the due-on clause under any other circumstances would
be tantamount to an unreasonable restraint on alienation.'
The Wellenkamp decision is the final episode in a recent
series of California Supreme Court cases that have sought to
restrict use of the due-on-sale clause.7 The policy decisions re-
"Assuming" a loan differs from taking "subject-to" the loan. If a new buyer takes
"subject-to," he is not the primary debtor and is not liable for any deficiency. But he
does have the right to pay off the existing note on the property should the debtor-seller
fail to do so.
4. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). The Wellenkamp court
was concerned with exercise of the due-on-sale clause as it affects the "outright sale."
The court construed this term very broadly to mean "any sale by the trustor of property
wherein legal title (and usually possession) is transferred." Id. at 950, 582 P.2d at 974,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
Wellenkamp involved exercise of a due-on-sale clause in a note and deed of trust,
where the new buyer agreed to pay the seller-debtor's equity interest and assume the
outstanding loan on the property. Such a transaction is referred to as a "cash to loan"
sale. But the court also included in its holding the "all cash to seller" sale, where the
seller-debtor receives full payment from the buyer, as is typical in obtaining new
financing.
The so-called "Wellenkamp assumption" means the lender is not involved. In-
stead of the buyer entering into a formal assumption with the lender, the buyer need
only enter into an agreement with the seller to take over payments and the obligation
of the existing loan. The lender treats this as a "subject-to" transaction and charges
no fees, points, or other amounts. Seminar by Fred Crane, Real Estate Loan Takeover
(Jan. 30, 1979)(Fred Crane was the attorney for plaintiff Wellenkamp).
5. The court used the "quantum of restraint versus justification" test as set forth
in Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1974). They came to the same result as in Tucker-that impairment of security
(i.e., waste to the property or risks from an uncreditworthy buyer) is the only valid
justification for exercise of the due-on clause. 21 Cal. 3d at 949-52, 582 P.2d at 974-76,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-85. Otherwise, the quantum of restraint on alienation is just too
great.
6. Professor John Hetland, a notable authority in the Real Property Secured
Transaction area, has stated that the "impairment of security" situation, under which
the due-on clause may be validly exercised, is virtually eliminated. Hetland, After
Wellenkamp, CAL. REAL ESTATE, Dec. 1978, at 40. Thus, Wellenkamp severely limits
the lender's use of the due-on clause, if, in fact, it has any real utility at all.
7. Wellenkamp (and the cases cited below) finds broad substantiation in CAL.
CIv. CODE § 711 (West 1954), which states: "Conditions restraining alienation, when
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flected in these cases have presented many new problems for
the home lending industry.8 One of these problems is preemp-
tion: since Wellenkamp is a state court decision, there is some
confusion as to whether its holding applies to federal savings
and loan associations, which are primarily governed by the
Home Owner's Loan Act (HOLA).1 This comment presents an
overview of the case in favor of preemption, arguing that
Wellenkamp should not apply to federal associations because
specific federal regulations apply.
Finding a solution to the federal preemption problem in
light of the Wellenkamp decision is important for two reasons.
repugnant to the interest created, are void."
Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 312, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964),
involved an AGREEMENT NOT TO ENCUMBER OR TRANSFER PROPERTY in consideration for
a loan made on real property. While recognizing that such agreements are restraints
on alienation, the California Supreme Court held, inter alia, that as long as the agree-
ment is reasonable, it is a valid restraint.
La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr.
849 (1971), declared that the lender cannot retain absolute discretion to determine
whether exercise of a due-on-encumbrance clause was proper. The due-on-
encumbrance clause is similar to the due-on-sale clause. The difference is that instead
of giving the lender the option to accelerate due to a sale of the property by the
borrower, it allows the lender to accelerate on any further encumbrance of the property
(e.g., junior liens). The court held that enforcement of the clause is valid to the extent
necessary to protect the lender's security.
La Sala became the subject of legislation with the enactment of CAL. Cxv. CODE §
2949 (West 1974) which defeats any acceleration based upon further encumbering the
property for single-family, owner-occupied dwellings. In 1975, CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924.6
(West Supp. 1979), extended this prohibition to all one-to-four unit residential dwell-
ings.
Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1974), involved the validity of a due-on-sale clause exercised by the lender after
the debtor entered into an installment land-sale contract with new purchasers. The
court held that exercise of the clause was an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The
Tucker test, subsequently adopted by the Wellenkamp court, was a balancing between
the justification for the restraint and the quantum of restraint imposed on the debtor.
The court reasoned that discretionary enforcement of the due-on clause by a lender
would completely "chill" alienation by installment land sale contract. Against this
restraint, only an impairment of the lender's security could justify this "chilling"
effect. The court suggested that impairment could be shown by either (1) demonstrat-
ing that alienation would somehow cause waste to the property; or, (2) showing that
alienation was needed to guard against the "moral risks" of having to resort to the
property (security) upon default (e.g., an uncreditworthy buyer). But the court found
such impairment was not proved in the case. See also Hetland, supra note 6, at 41-42.
8. See Advisory Memo to Savings and Loan Associations, California Savings and
Loan League (Sept. 15, 1978). For the most recent treatment of problems which
Wellenkamp presents at this time, see Goodman, The Wellenkamp Decision: How It
Will Effect Real Estate Financing, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 34, (1979); Hetland, supra note 6.
Other articles appear in CAL. REAL ESTATE, Jan. 1979, at 36 (on retroactivity of
Wellenkamp) and CAL. REAL ESTATE, Feb. 1979, at 16 (on federal preemption).
9. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1976).
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First, a substantial number of savings and loan associations in
California are federals. 0 Whether they will be able to use the
due-on-sale device to adjust interest rates, depends upon
whether federal law governs" or whether Wellenkamp applies.
Second, the question of preemption involves important consti-
tutional considerations regarding the supremacy and the com-
merce clauses of the United States Constitution.
This comment will approach the case for preemption by:
1) discussing the federal system that governs savings and loan
associations, illustrating the framework under which federal
and state associations operate; 2) examining preemption vis-a-
vis the supremacy clause; 3) showing that Congress in the
Home Owner's Loan Act (which created federal associations)
intended federal law only to apply to federal associations; 4)
examining the proposition that Wellenkamp creates an undue
burden on interstate commerce and violates supremacy of fed-
eral law under the commerce clause by interfering with a con-
gressional mandate in the Home Owner's Loan Act; 5) explain-
ing that the due-on-sale clause is essential to the reduction of
savings and loan liquidity problems and therefore should be
retained as an interest adjusting device; and 6) presenting the
current disposition of People v. Glendale Federal Savings and
Loan Association2 and Glendale Federal Savings and Loan
Association v. Fox,'" where the preemption problem has been
recognized by the courts."
THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM
The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) was created as an
independent federal agency by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Act of 1932.11 It is a central credit facility and a regulatory body
for member savings and loan associations. Local functions are
controlled by twelve regional Federal Home Loan Banks div-
ided into twelve districts, whose stock is held by the member
10. Out of 153 savings and loan associations in California at 12/31/77, 73 were
federals (41%). [19771 SAVINGS & LOAN COMMISSIONER ANN. REP. 23-25.
11. See note 22 infra.
12. No. C 147921 (Super. Ct. L.A. County 1979)(minute order dismissing case
on the merits on grounds of collateral estoppel for loans made after June 8, 1976, and
finding for plaintiffs on loans made prior to June 8, 1976).
13. 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
14. See Knox, The Due-on Claue: A Preemption Controversy, 10 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 628 (1977) for a list of cases filed in California regarding the preemption question
and federal associations.
15. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1976), especially § 1437(b).
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banks of that district. These regional banks provide local ad-
justments by serving as a means of secondary financing in
times of heavy withdrawal of deposits (labeled "advances"),"
helping adjust for the seasonal outflow of savings, and shifting
resources from capital-surplus areas to capital-deficient areas.
At the head of the system is a three-member Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), whose duty it is to charter and
regulate federal associations and govern the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) 7 and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC).8
The division of labor between the federal and state govern-
ment centers on chartering of the associations. Federally-
chartered associations are organized as "mutuals" (i.e., owned
by their depositors and borrowers), and recently, may be organ-
ized under Charter S11 as a stock association. In California,
most state-chartered associations are owned by their stock-
holders, although a few are mutuals. This difference in charter-
ing is important because different laws are applied in each
instance.
All federal associations are members of the Bank System
by regulation, and are required to be insured by the FSLIC.
They are governed by the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933 and
regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. State asso-
ciations do not have to be members of the FSLIC '". and are not
16. "Advances" are loans to the associations by a Federal Home Loan Bank
(FHLB), which serve as the primary source of funds for everyday cash needs when
savings flows decrease. Advances to members of the FHLB of San Francisco at
12/31/77 were almost $5 billion. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, Annual
Report 27 (1977). They are an expensive form of credit. For example, the FHLB of San
Francisco was charging 10.75% on Short-Term Credit (70 to 360 days), effective Nov.
16, 1978. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, Bulletin No. 170 (Nov. 15, 1978).
17. National Housing Act of 1934, §§ 401-407, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730 (1976). The
FSLIC serves as the insuring body for all savings accounts under the Federal Home
Loan Bank System.
18. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, §§ 301-310, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1459
(1976). The FHLMC serves as one of several quasi-governmental and private corpora-
tions, that provides a secondary market for mortgages.
19. 12 C.F.R. §§ 552.1-12 (1979). A "Charter S" association is a federal savings
and loan which is a stock (shareholder owned) instead of a mutual (depositor owned)
organization.
19.1. This statement, regarding FSLIC membership, should be qualified as it
applies to state-chartered savings and loan associations in California. The regulation
on point is found in 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 145.11 (1978), which states: "No savings
and loan association shall commence in this state the business of accepting savings,
unless its accounts are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion." (Emphasis added.) The California Department of Savings and Loan has inter-
preted this section as requiring all state-chartered savings and loans, before being
19801
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governed by the Home Owner's Loan Act. However, ninety-five
percent of the state-chartered associations have insurance
through the FSLIC.10 This connection makes them members of
the system and, at least to some extent, brings them within the
ambit of federal regulations. As of 1974, the FHLBB supervised
2,048 federals and 2,030 state-chartered institutions." It is
within this institutional setting of the Federal Home Loan
Bank System, that the question of preemption must be viewed.
WELLENKAMP AND THE PREEMPTION ISSUE
An understanding of the Bank System is only the first
inquiry necessary in deciding whether Wellenkamp applies to
federal associations. Whether a federal law preempts state law
requires an analysis of congressional intent and a constitu-
tional inquiry into the supremacy and commerce clauses.
The federal regulation in question is spelled out in Title 12,
section 545.6-11(f) and (g) of the Code of Federal Regulations"
licensed to operate, to have FSLIC insurance. It is also the Department's understand-
ing, however, although not covered expressly by statute or regulation, that such insur-
ance should be kept during the association's operation.
20. B. Gup, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES: AN INTRODUCTION 51 (1976). At year-end
1977, there were a total of 188 associations belonging to the FHLB of San Francisco
(District 11, serving Cal., Nev., Ariz.), of which 79 were federally-chartered and 109
were state-chartered. U.S. LEAGUE OF SAVINGS AND LOANS, SAVINGS AND LOAN FACT BOOK
1978, at 96.
21. 9 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J., Apr. 1976, at 2.
22. The relevant part of 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (1979) follows:
(f) Due-on-sale clauses. A Federal association continues to have the
power to include, as a matter of contract between it and the borrower, a
provision in its loan instruments whereby the association may, at its
option, declare immediately due and payable all of the sums secured by
the association's security instrument if all or any part of the real property
securing the loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the asso-
ciation's prior written consent. Except as provided in paragraph (g) of
this section with respect to loans made after July 31, 1976, on the security
of a home occupied or to be occupied by the borrower, excercise by an
association of such an acceleration option (hereafter called a due-on-sale
clause) shall be governed exclusively by the terms of the contract between
the association and the borrower, and all rights and remedies of the
association and borrower thereto shall be fixed and governed by said
contract.
(g) Limitations on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses. (1) With
respect to any loan made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home
occupied or to be occupied by the borrower, a Federal association may
not exercise a due-on-sale clause based on any of the following:
(i) Creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the asso-
ciation's security instrument;
(ii) Creation of a purchase money security interest for household
appliances;
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promulgated by the FHLBB. Section (f) is the authorizing
clause, allowing federal associations to use the due-on-sale
(iii) Transfer by devise, descent, or by operation of law upon the
death of a joint tenant; or
(iv) Grant of any leasehold interest of three years or less not con-
taining an option to purchase.
(2) With respect to any loan made after July 31, 1976, on the secu-
rity of a home occupied or to be occupied by the borrower, no Federal
association shall impose a prepayment charge or equivalent fee in connec-
tion with the acceleration of the loan pursuant to the exercise of a due-
on-sale clause.
(3) With respect to any loan made after July 31, 1976, on the secu-
rity of a home occupied or to be occupied by the borrower, a Federal
association shall have waived its option to exercise a due-on-sale clause
as to a specific transfer if, prior to that transfer, the association and the
person to whom the property is to be sold or transferred (the existing
borrower's successor in interest) reach written agreement that the credit
of such person is satisfactory to the association and that the interest
payable to the association on sums secured by its security instrument
shall be at such rate as the association shall request. Upon such written
agreement and resultant waiver, the association shall release such exist-
ing borrower from all obligations under the loan instruments, and for
purposes of § 541.14(a) the association shall be deemed to have made a
new loan to such existing borrower's successor in interest.
Another relevant code section is 12 C.F.R. § 556.9 (1979) which states:
Imposition of late charges and due-on-sale clauses.
(a) The Board allows Federal savings and loan associations certain
authority to incorporate into loan instruments provisions for imposition
of late charges, prepayment charges, and exercise of acceleration clauses,
including due-on-sale clauses. The Board expects associations to adopt
procedures sufficient to ensure that, no later than the time of loan closing,
the rights and obligations of the contracting parties under these provi-
sions are fully and specifically disclosed to borrowers.
(c) Paragraph 545.6-11 (g)(1) of this subchapter prohibits with re-
spect to borrower-occupied-home loans made after July 31, 1976, exercise
of due-on-sale clauses to accelerate the loan based on creation of junior
liens, certain purchase-money security interests, transfers by devise, de-
scent, or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant, and certain
short-term leasehold interests. However, the Board believes that there
may be other situations respecting loans made on the security of
borrower-occupied homes in which, depending on the circumstances of
the individual case, it will be appropriate for Federal associations to
waive their contractual right to accelerate. These situations include
transfers of title to members of the borrower's immediate family, includ-
ing a former spouse in connection with a divorce, who occupy or will
occupy the property. . . .In addition, associations should consider waiv-
ing any right to require an increase in interest rate pursuant to a due-on-
sale clause in cases of extreme hardship to the existing borrower.
(d) Paragraph 545.6-11 (g)(3) of the subchapter authorizes Federal
associations to increase the interest rate as a condition of loan assump-
tion. However, the Board expects that no association will request an
increase in the interest rate to a rate in excess of the then prevailing rate
on comparable new loans made by the association applying its normal
underwriting standards.
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clause as a matter of contract between the association and the
borrower. Section (g) presents the limitations under which the
due-on-sale clause may be exercised.
Two questions must be answered to determine if section
545.6-11(f) preempts Wellenkamp: First, is there any real con-
flict between Wellenkamp and the federal rule? And second,
although FHLBB regulations have been held preemptive in
internal affairs of savings and loans, does this preemptive
power also extend to contract rights involving a borrower that
may go beyond the scope of internal affairs? The resolution of
these questions depends to a large extent upon congressional
intent expressed in the Home Owner's Loan Act (HOLA). 3
Wellenkamp and Section 545.6-11(f), (g)-The Supremacy
Clause Argument
It is a well-established principle of constitutional law that
when a valid federal law" conflicts with a state law, the federal
law prevails. 5 Since the FHLBB is an instrumentality and
agency of the United States Government charged with admin-
istering federal law, its regulations, like congressional legisla-
tion, are also preemptive."
McCulloch v. Maryland"l recognized the importance of
having various implied powers vested in Congress in order to
implement those powers expressly granted under article I, sec-
tion 8 of the U.S. Constitution. In McCulloch, the Supreme
Court held that Congress could create the Second Bank of the
United States, as it was a necessary and proper means in carry-
23. See note 9 supra.
24. The meaning of "valid," is that Congress has been empowered to enact laws
necessary and proper to carrying out those enumerated powers under art. I, § 8 of the
U.S. Constitution.
25. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 states:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme law of the land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Consti-
tution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46 (1907); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
26. Bartlett, The Federal-State Preemption Conflict, 44 U.S. LEAGUE OF SAVINGS
AND LOANS LEGAL BULLETIN 1, 1-2 (1978) [hereinafter LEGAL BULLETIN]; 12 U.S.C. §
1464(h) (1976); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Loomis, 97 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1938);
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); People v.
Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951); H. RUSSELL, SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS 563-64 (1960).
27. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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ing out the federal government's fiscal operations. Based on the
McCulloch rationale, the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933, es-
tablishing federal savings and loans governed by the FHLBB,
has been upheld as a constitutional exercise of congressional
power. 8
The Supreme Court has addressed the subject of preemp-
tive federal power many times, and has come up with the fol-
lowing general rule: A state law may be preempted if it is
directly contrary to a federal law on point and Congress ex-
presses an intent to preempt through uniform national policy,
or if the state law somehow frustrates the purpose of the federal
law," or has a basic incompatability with it, even though not
inconsistent ° The Court has shown that Congress may even
preempt state "police" powers, 3' should they conflict with, or
frustrate a federal law." For our purposes then, although fed-
eral associations are subject to some state regulation, 33 the
FHLBB has plenary powers in many areas. This power is ex-
plicit in HOLA3' and, with the force of the supremacy clause,
preempts Wellenkamp.
28. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); People v. Coast Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951); U.S. v. Kay, 89 F.2d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir.
1937).
29. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973). As to what constitutes a "conflict" with state law, see
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963)(a conflict exists
"where compliance with both federal and state regulation is a physical impossibility
.. " Id. at 142-43); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)(where the state law
"[s]tands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and
objectives of Congress." Id. at 67).
30. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
31. These police powers (e.g., those protecting health, safety and welfare), have
traditionally been held to be within those powers expressly reserved to the states under
the 10th amendment. The 10th amendment of the United States Constitution states:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
32. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), held that federal law
preempted a Washington State law regulating tankers navigating on Puget Sound.
Such safety regulations were vested, by Congress, in the Secretary of Transportation
exclusively, precluding even stricter state provisions. See also National League of
Cities v. Usery, 429 U.S. 833 (1976).
33. E.g., Larwood v. San Diego Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 185 Cal. App. 2d 450, 8
Cal. Rptr. 362 (1960) (federals must comply with state usury laws); see also 12 U.S.C.
§ 1425 (1976) and First Fed. Say. & Loan of Atlanta v. Norwood Realty, 212 Ga. 524,
93 S.E.2d 763 (1956).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) states:
(a) In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which
people may invest their funds and in order to provide for the financing
of homes, the Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it
may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examina-
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The Congressional Intent Argument
Theory and law. The United States Supremacy Court has
indicated, however, that when a state's exercise of its power is
challenged under the supremacy clause, "we start with the
assumption that the historic. . . powers of the States were not
to be superceded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress. "I As the Federal District
Court in Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Fox
aptly put it:
The relevant inquiry is whether Congress has either explic-
itly or implicitly declared that the States are prohibited
from regulating the loan instruments of federal savings and
loan associations chartered by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board."
The congressional intent in HOLA is found in its state-
ment of purpose:
In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which
people may invest their funds and in order to provide for
the financing of homes, the Board (FHLBB) is authorized,
under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to
provide for the organization, incorporation, examination,
operation, and regulation of associations to be known as
'Federal Savings and Loan Associations,' and to be issued
charters therefor, giving primary consideration to the best
tion, operation, and regulation of associations to be known as "Federal
Savings and Loan Associations", and to issue charters therefor, giving
primary consideration to the best practices of local mutual thrift and
home-financing institutions in the United States. (Emphasis added.)
McKenna, Control and Management of Federal Savings and Loans, 27 So. CAL. L.
REv. 47, 53 (1953) states:
A reasonable conclusion from Section 5, particularly paragraphs (a) and
(d) of the HOLA (now 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(a). and (d)) and the references
to regulations is a Congressional mandate that uniform rules be pre-
scribed for the conduct of all units in the federal savings & loan system.
35. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)(emphasis added).
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. makes it clear that this "clear and manifest purpose of
Congress" can be either express (declared by statute itself) or implied (state policy
frustrates or the scheme is so pervasive as to reasonably infer Congress meant only
federal action, or where the federal interest precludes the state from acting because it
is so dominant). 435 U.S. at 157-58.
36. Glendale Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903,907 (C.D. Cal.
1978)(order granting partial summary judgment); Plaintiff's Points & Authorities in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Glendale Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Fox, No. CV 77-3274-WMB, at 5 (C.D. Cal. 1978) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Points &
Authorities]..,
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practices of local mutual thrift and home-financing insti-
tutions in the United States. (Emphasis added.) 7
When this statute is analyzed with the historical perspective
under which HOLA was enacted-a time when many home-
owners were defaulting on their loans-it is evident that a uni-
form system was needed to rebuild the home-financing indus-
try and to stop ruinous state practices.
3
The need for a uniform federal scheme was apparent when
the Ninth Circuit stated that the FHLBB governs the entire
range of federal savings and loan practices "from . . . cradle
to . . . corporate grave.39 The court stressed that "no provi-
sion is made for sharing the Board's delegated authority with
state regulatory or supervisory agencies.""
In addition, Congress has mandated a procedure for home
loan lending" which implicitly 2 must include the due-on-sale
clause. The reason is that the due-on provision is an essential
term in all loan contracts in which it is included. And finally,
the mandate for uniformity seems to be the Bank Board's inter-
pretation of HOLA, since it has enacted an entire regulatory
scheme for home loans, including due-on-sale clauses. 3
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976).
38. The statute creating federal associations is-valid under the "general welfare"
clause, in view of the national scope of the problem of preserving home ownership
and promoting sound systems for home mortgages. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Loomis, 97 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. dismissed sub. nom. Martin v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 305 U.S. 666 (1939).
The HOLA preamble (12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)) suggests it was passed because of state
"sharp lending practices." Seminar by Fred Crane, supra note 4.
39. People v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal.
1951); Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir.
1974); see also McKenna, supra -note 34, and Plaintiff's Points & Authorities, supra
note 36, at 11 n.10, quoting MARVELL, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD 26 (1969):
"[Tihe states had developed a hodge podge of savings and loan laws and regulations,
and Congress hoped that FHLBB rules would set an example for uniform and sound
savings and loan regulations."
40. People v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal.
1951).
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1976).
42. See Greenwald v. First Fed. Say. & Loan of Boston, No. 76-3931-C, at 5 (D.
Mass. 1978), affirmed No. 78-1155 (1st Cir. 1979):
Every Federal Court which has addressed preemption questions involving
HOLA has held that Congress impliedly intended that federal law should
govern the regulation of federal savings and loan associations. . . .Such
holdings establish the impropriety of any state regulation in the area.
(Emphasis added.)
43. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.6 (1979); FHLBB Resolution 76-296, at 1-2, 5 (Apr. 28,
1976). The argument that the FHLBB regulation preempts state law only on internal
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Case interpretation. In addition to the Bank Board and
Congress, the courts have interpreted the intent behind HOLA
as one demanding uniformity. In People v. Coast Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association," the issue presented was whether
state or federal law would apply where a federal savings and
loan was charged with transacting business in such a way that
the public was led to believe it was a bank. The misrepresen-
tation was a violation of state law. Addressing the preemption
problem, the court stated:
Not only does the act of Congress (HOLA) which author-
ized the creation, operation and supervision of federal sav-
ings and loan associations by the Home Loan Board, em-
brace the entire field, but the comprehensive rules and
regulations adopted by the Board clearly meet the test of
covering the subject matter of the Statute. 5
[Als to federal savings and loan associations, Congress
made plenary, preemptive delegation to the Board to or-
ganize, incorporate, supervise and regulate, leaving no
field for state supervision.'" (Emphasis added.)
In another case, Meyers v. Beverly Hills Federal Savings
and Loan Association,'7 the Ninth Circuit agreed with the
Coast Federal approach on facts very similar to Wellenkamp.
In Meyers, plaintiff borrowers alleged that prepayment penalty
provisions in the loan agreements of federal associations were
void under California law.'8 The court, taking notice of the
Coast Federal principle-that the Board promulgated compre-
hensive regulations covering the association from its cradle to
its corporate grave-found that "somewhere between the cra-
affairs of associations is without validity in light of two recent judicial opinions. Con-
ference Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Silberman, No. S-78-55 PCW (E.D. Cal. 1978)
(federal anti-redlining laws held to apply); Wash. Say. League v. Chapman, No. C 78-
163 S, at 4 (W..D. Wash. 1978) (order granting preliminary injunction filed Mar. 30,
1978) (federal anti-redlining laws apply).
The Silberman and Chapman cases go beyond mere internal affairs since the
practice of redlining-failure to lend in low-income areas-affects potential borrowers.
This same effect is analogous to the effect on borrowers that a due-on-sale clause would
have. Silberman also involved a due-on-sale issue, but only the red-lining issue has
been appealed.
44. 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
45. Id. at 318. See also 13 AM. JuR. 2d, Building and Loan Assocs. § 10 n.5 (1964).
46. 98 F. Supp. at 219; Lyons Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 377 F. Supp.
11, 17 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
47. 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974).
48. The alleged violation concerned CAL. CIv. CODE § 1670 (West 1979), which
provides that every contract by which an amount of damages is to be paid for breach
of that contract, is void if determined in anticipation thereof.
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die and the grave is 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-12(b), which specifically
covers the area of prepayment penalties . . . ." The due-on-
sale clause, like the prepayment penalty of Meyers, and asso-
ciation advertising practices of Coast Federal, similarly affects
the public. It is therefore difficult to distinguish the due-on-
sale clause from Meyers or Coast Federal on the grounds that
the latter cases are regulations of internal affairs that do not
affect the public.
In the Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Fox case, the FHLBB recognized that, even though section
545.6-11(f), (g) is said to apply on or after June 8, 1976,50 the
wide use of due-on-sale clauses by federals was evident during
annual examinations and audits before that date and that such
practices had thereby received the Board's tacit approval.5'
Also, Board regulations" provided that all loan contracts were
to give full protection to associations. The Bank Board inter-
preted the 1948 regulation as authorizing use of the due-on-sale
clause as necessary to achieve such full protection.53
Furthermore, HOLA provides that the FHLBB is to regu-
late "giving primary consideration to the best practices of local
mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the United
States."" One of the goals Congress sought in that section of
49. 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Kaski v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
of Madison, 240 N.W.2d 367 (1976), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court, drawing
from Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, upheld an interest rate escala-
tion clause contained in a note of a federal association. The court held that "it is
apparent that Congress has substantially occupied the field in regard to the regulation
of federal savings and loan associations, particularly in the area of the regulation of
lending practices." Id. at 371.
50. FHLBB Resolution No. 76-296, at 6 (Apr. 28, 1976).
51. Examinations are held pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 1726(b), 1730(m)(1)-(2)
(1977).
52. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (1979).
53. See, e.g., Letter from FHLBB to the individual addressed (June 6,
1974)(unpublished, government agency ruling), reprinted in U.S. LEAGUE OF SAy. &
LOAN, FED. GUIDE § 12, Para. U 12-49.70, which provides:
[lit is our view that the association could require the purchaser, as a
condition of permitting the substitution, to assume the mortgage at the
increased rate with increased monthly payments . . . . This clause was
in use for all lending by the association prior to January 1, 1974, and is
currently used for all of its lending . . . . We agree with the association
that the opportunity to deal with new customers on a current rate basis
is desirable.
See also 7 FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BO AD JOURNAL 25 (Sept. 1974) reprinted in U.S.
LEAGUE OF SAY. & LOAN, FED. GUIDE § 14 (ruling issued by the Office of the General
Counsel of the FHLBB).
54. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)(1976) (emphasis added).
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HOLA, was to improve upon the failures of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act.5 A major shortcoming of that legislation was
that a variety of conflicting state policies governed the home-
financing system." Realizing that Congress sought to remedy
this shortcoming, an Illinois federal court in Lyons Savings and
Loan Association v. FHLBB57 held that HOLA requires the
Board to give "primary consideration to the best practices of
local . . . home-financing institutions in the United States.""8
The decision went on to say that "the courts have construed
this language as vesting discretion in the Board to determine,
first, what the 'best practices' are, and second, to implement
them on a nationally uniform basis." 9 Finally, the court noted
that state law cannot limit what the Board thinks is the "best
practice, . . . without undermining this fundamental purpose
of the statute." 60
Assuming that preemption only applied to the governing
of an association's internal affairs, the court in Kaski v. First
Federal Savings and Loan of Madison recognized that
"regulation of loan practices directly affects the internal man-
agement and operations of federal associations and therefore
requires uniform federal control."'" The FHLBB, in its Resolu-
tion No. 75-647, argued that applying state law to due-on-sale
provisions did involve internal affairs of the association since
it regulated when and under what terms new members could
be accepted. 2 The Board further argued that the efficiency of
55. For example, by 1933-one year after passage of the Act and the year HOLA
was passed-40% of all home loans in the U.S. were in default. Plaintiff's Points &
Authorities, supra note 36, at 7. See generally FHLBB, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK
SYSTEM, 17-28 (1961).
56. See Marvell, supra note 35. For example, the Home Owner's Loan Corpora-
tion (HOLC) was created under HOLA to exchange its obligations for mortgages held
by all savings and loan associations. But in striving for a uniform standard, HOLC
would only take loans providing for direct repayment in equal monthly installments.
It would not accept those loans with provisions in widespread use under state laws,
which practices were injurious to associations. These practices included balloon pay-
ments and repayment by requiring "sinking fund" savings accounts. The clear intent
was to suppress these dangerous state practices which varied so much from state to
state. For more on the mandate of uniformity see People v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 821, 826 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
57. 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Il. 1974). Lyons discussed HOLA § 5(a), 12 U.S.C. §
1464(a) (1976) in relation to branching.
58. 377 F. Supp. at 17.
59. Id. at 18.
60. Id. at 17-18.
61. 240'N.W.2d 367, 373 (1976).
62. 44 LEGAL BULL. 1, 8 (1977). Under 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(i) (1977), the federal
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federal associations would be impaired and state law would
further interfere with the purpose of HOLA.63
In summary, it is established that federal law preempts
state law where Congress has, expressly or impliedly, intended
that federal law should apply. An examination of HOLA and
its historical setting clearly shows congressional intent for a
uniform national policy regarding federal savings and loan as-
sociations. Also, HOLA authorized the FHLBB to exercise its
regulatory authority in order to accomplish this uniform policy
after looking at all the best practices of the states. Further-
more, it is firmly established that federal law is preemptive in
areas of internal affairs of federal associations and it has been
recognized that regulation of loan practices (including due-on
clauses) is internal.
The Interstate Commerce Argument
In addition to the supremacy clause and clear congres-
sional intent, Wellenkamp's applicability to federal associa-
tions may be attacked on grounds that it unduly burdens inter-
state commerce."
Whether savings and loan activity is within this definition
of interstate commerce, is without question. 5 Gibbons v.
Ogden,"6 the seminal case validating federal power to regulate
interstate commerce, interpreted the commerce clause very
broadly. This commerce includes not only "traffic among and
between the states, but intercourse" as well.67 Savings and loan
associations are involved in a nationwide network of lending
practices. 8 In addition, the Federal Home Loan Bank System,
associations may, by charter, make obligors members of the association. Also, 12
C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(4) (1979) requires all new federal associations to make savers and
borrowers members of the association.
63. For an explanation on how efficiency would be impaired, see text accompany-
ing notes 78-97 infra.
64. Art. I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution holds that Congress shall have the power
"[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States .... "
65. See RUSSELL, SAVINGS AND LOAN ASsoCIATIONS 561 (1960), citing First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Loomis, 97 F.2d 831 (1938), which states, "Many authorities...
have taken the position that the powers to provide for the 'general welfare' and to
regulate commerce . . ." could be invoked to justify congressional action involving
savings and loans. (Emphasis added.)
66. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1864).
67. This includes all commercial intercourse between different states, and all
component parts of that intercourse. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
68. Nationwide lending is described in 12 C.F.R. § 563.9 (1979). Section (a)
describes this practice as involving the making or purchasing of loans "on the security
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operating through quasi-governmental entities,"9 promotes the
flow of funds into the national housing market by establishing
an active secondary market in mortgages. 0 Both these prac-
tices involve the transfer of funds over state lines, well within
the scope of interstate commerce set out in Gibbons.
When a state attempts to regulate a business in interstate
commerce, the United States Supreme Court may determine
whether or not federal law exists that preempts state law. The
Court has used various methods, including the traditional test
found in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of
Philadelphia," and, the Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co." analy-
sis, which is the general test the Court focuses on today.
In Cooley, the Court held that where Congress enacts legis-
lation dealing with a problem of national concern, it may re-
quire a uniform system; that is, Congress may justly call for
exclusive federal legislation. Congress has made a demand for
a uniform system in the Home Owner's Loan Act, creating
federal associations and making the FHLBB their exclusive
governing agent." Ray looked to congressional intent behind
the federal law in order to judge whether it preempts state
law." A review of HOLA shows that Congress did intend to give
exclusive governing power over federal associations to the
FHLBB.15
The state law, declared in Wellenkamp, is a burden on
of real estate located outside its normal lending territory .... Id. § 563.9(2) (empha-
sis added). Lenders may also participate with other lenders in making these loans.
Federal savings and loan associations are permitted to make such loans. U.S. LEAGUE
OF SAVINGS AND LOANS, FEDERAL GUIDE 6116 (opinion of the General Counsel of the
FHLBB, Oct. 24, 1967).
69. These entities include the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, the
Federal National Mortgage Association, and the Government National Mortgage Cor-
poration.
70. U.S. LEAGUE OF SAVINGS AND LOANS, SAVINGS AND LOAN FACT BOOK 1978, at
113.
71. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
72. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
73. See text accompanying notes 38-63 supra, for the argument that HOLA was
a congressional mandate for a uniform system.
74. The Ray court stated that:
The Court's prior cases indicate that when a State's exercise of its police
power is challenged under the Supremacy Clause, "we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."
435 U.S. at 157 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
75. See text accompanying notes 35-63 supra, for the congressional intent argu-
ment in support of preemption.
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interstate commerce and is therefore preempted, because it
frustrates the purpose of national uniformity since it is contra-
dictory to an express regulation of the Bank Board allowing the
due-on-sale clause.
The case of San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon5 confirms the notion that an important factor in a
question of preemption is "the fact that Congress has entrusted
administration of the. . . policy for the Nation to a centralized
administrative agency . . . ."" In our case, such an agency is
the FHLBB, authorized to set a uniform policy for the nation's
savings and loans. Frustration of this purpose by state law is
an impermissible burden on Congress' commerce power.
Preemption and the Economics of Interest Rate Adjustment
In judging whether Wellenkamp applies to federals, this
comment suggests that the congressional intent in HOLA
should not be the only convincing factor in favor of preemption.
Since the passage of HOLA, a broad statutory scheme has
evolved that protects borrowers from the kinds of default prob-
lems encountered during The Depression. 8 But it is only a
healthy home-loan industry that can continue to successfully
carry out the full intent of HOLA.7' Therefore, it is important
to examine the potentially adverse effects of Wellenkamp on
the future operations of savings and loan associations.
Savings and loan associations have at least two recurring
economic problems: outward flow of funds, or disinterme-
76. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
77. Id. at 242. The Garmon case has been explained as illustrative of the "one
master" theory:
When Congress delegates broad regulatory power to a federal agency
without addressing itself to the question of preemption in any detail (as
is true in HOLA), the court (referring to the U.S. Supreme Court) infers
that the agency will make all of the regulations which it deems to be
required in the field. As a corollary of this principle, the court generally
infers that supplementary state regulations are to be pre-empted either
because of an inference that the federal agency's failure to establish simi-
lar regulations represents an agency judgment that they are not needed
or because of the operation of other presumptive considerations such as
the need for national uniformity.
BARRON & DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POuCv (1975), 288, quoting
from Hirsch, Towards a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 549-
50 (1972).
78. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
79. Residential financing has been revitalized since The Depression, to become
one of the most substantial uses of credit in the nation. See note 89 infra.
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diation, and profit "squeezes" caused by a peculiar asset-
liability structure. In part, disintermediation results from low
interest rate ceilings on deposits"' relative to other interest at-
tractive investments.8' The outflow of money, of course, di-
rectly reduces the amount of loanable funds available for mort-
gages, "and in some cases threaten[s] the very existence of
some savings and loan associations." 2 An equally perplexing
problem is that the asset structure of savings and loan associa-
tions (mostly loan repayments) is much more long-term than
the liability structure (mostly interest on savings). The inabil-
ity to turn over assets faster, resulting in existing loan rates
lagging behind market rates, coupled with high interest rates
being paid on shorter-term savings accounts, causes a profit
squeeze on savings and loan associations." To help prevent the
adverse effects of disintermediation and profit squeezes, the
due-on-sale provision assures an inflow of funds and quickly
adjusts low-yield loans to current market rates.
The rationale behind the due-on-sale clause is fairness to
the lender. When interest rates are high, the lender runs a risk
that the rates may drop, at which point the borrower will often
refinance his debt elsewhere at a lower rate and pay off the
original, higher interest rate loan. But, when funds are loaned
at lower interest rates, the lender runs the risk of losing the
benefit of later market increases in the rate. Thus, the due-on-
sale clause helps prevent the latter problem where there is an
assumption of an existing loan, thus offsetting the lender's
risks of refinancing should the rates drop.
There have been alternative suggestions for eliminating
the harmful effects of disintermediation and profit squeezes,
none of which are completely satisfactory. For example, the
secondary mortgage market is available for unloading low yield
loans. There are two reasons, however, why this is not very
profitable: First, a loan with lower yield will have to be dis-
counted by the difference between the lower face rate and the
higher market rate, in order to be saleable; and second, a loan
80. Federal Reserve Bank Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.0-.7 (1979) governs the
interest ceiling that is kept on savings deposits of financial institutions.
81. Short-term rates in the nation's money markets, rose more than 150 basis
points from April to October, 1977. This played a key role in inhibiting the inflow of
new savings during the latter half of 1977. FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO,
ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1977).
82. B. GuP, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 302 (1976).
83. Id. at 53.
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without a due-on-sale provision is less attractive than a loan
with such a provision. Thus, associations in states that allow
due-on provisions would have a distinct advantage over those
states that do not allow such provisions in terms of saleability."4
Another alternative to the due-on-sale clause for interest
rate adjustment is the Variable Rate Mortgage (VRM, or Vari-
able Interest Rate-VIR). Pursuant to California Civil Code
section 1916.5,85 the VRM can increase a maximum of 2.5 per-
cent based upon a Cost of Deposits and Borrowings Index of the
FHLB. The problem is that there is currently no active second-
ary market for VRM's since VRM's are still in their unproven,
experimental stage. As of June 30, 1979, only twenty-three of
one hundred eight associations in California were using the
variable rate device.8  Moreover, an association would be
placed in the precarious position of being forced to rely on set
maximum increases provided by the VRM, while decreases in
rate are unlimited." Finally, use of VRM's by federal associa-
84. 41 Fed. Reg. 6283, 6285 (1976)(to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545). See also
Knox, supra note 14, at 638 (quoting from the Opinion of the Office of Economic
Research on the revocation of the due-on-sale clause in the State of California):
The Office of Economic Research views the revocation of the "due-on-sale
clause" as a factor that will lead to higher mortgage interest rates and
will reduce the marketability of such mortgages in the secondary market
... . [T]he due-on-sale clause is an important part of the mortgage
contract throughout the country, and its revocation sets a dangerous
precedent in terms of the consequences in the mortgage market.
It is noteworthy that Covenant 17 of the Uniform Deed of Trust, issued by the
Federal National Mortgage Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpo-
ration, is a due-on-sale clause.
85. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.5 (West Supp. 1979) authorizes state-chartered asso-
ciations. The FHLBB has recently approved use of the Variable Rate instrument for
federal associations, effective January 1, 1979, pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-2(a), (c)
(1979).
86. Telephone conversation with Joseph Vella, California Department of Savings
and Loan, quoting from an internal report entitled "Mortgage Loans Outstanding"
(Nov. 7, 1979). The FHLBB has also noted the experimental nature of VRM's, regard-
ing the recent approval of the instrument for federal associations. See note 85 supra.
They have classified the instrument as "controversial" and plan on monitoring associa-
tion's offering VRM's "to ascertain whether borrowers are being offered an effective
choice." 43 Fed. Reg. 59337 (1978).
In addition, 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-2(c)(2)(b)(iii)(1979) provides an expiration date (4
years after implementation) for the regulations approving VRM usage by federal asso-
ciations. The FHLBB claims the reason for this expiration date is "to give the Bank
Board sufficient time to assess the value and effect of VRM's in the mortgage market."
43 Fed. Reg. 59337 (1978).
87. The unlimited decrease in rate can be a heavy burden, because downward
adjustments must be made, while increases are at the lender's option. 12 C.F.R. §
545.6-2(c)(4)(iv) (1979).
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tions is very restricted."
In addition to eliminating the dangers of profit squeezes
and disintermediation, the due-on-sale clause serves another
purpose. Rising interest rates are often part of a design by
federal monetary authorities to make credit less available, and
tighten the money supply. This is true especially during an
inflationary period. Allowing assumptions of loans at lower in-
terest rates by abandoning the due-on-sale clause circumvents
this purpose. While the assumptions of home loans at lower
rates in California may only have a small effect compared to
all other credit activity in the country, new laws prohibiting the
due-on-sale clause may spread to other states thereby multi-
plying the aggregate effect."9 Already, Arizona 0 and Arkansas9
have joined California in what is currently the minority rule,
striking down the due-on clause for interest adjustment pur-
poses. 2
Another problem of limiting the lender's use of the due-on-
sale provision was pointed out by Justice Clark in his
Wellenkamp dissent. Future borrowers would have to pay
much higher interest rates to offset the losses the association
will sustain as a result of Wellenkamp. The Justice states that,
"in attempting to assist the Wellenkamps, the majority opin-
ion must necessarily restrict if not dry up mortgage funds oth-
erwise available to the next generation of borrowers." 3
Finally, the FHLBB has expressed its expectation that
interest rates, negotiated upon assumption of a loan after a
due-on-sale has been exercised, will not be unconscionable.
Lenders permitting written assumption with interest adjust-
88. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-2(c)(2)(a), (b) (1979) requires that the FHLBB determine
that a federal association needs the VRM "to maintain competitive balances with
other financial institutions. before the association is authorized to use the instru-
ment.
In addition, the disclosure documents (used to allow the borrower to make an
informed choice between VRM's and other types of loans) required by 12 C.F.R. §
545.6-2(c)(5) (1979), would be "costly and burdensome." 43 Fed. Reg. 59337 (1978).
89. There is evidence that home lending is not such a small proportion of total
credit activity in the United States. At year-end 1977, residential mortgage loans
outstanding totaled $760.6 billion (savings and loans held about $400 billion of this
amount), representing 23.1% of all credit outstanding in the United States. Only the
federal debt was of comparable size, at $730.9 billion. U.S. LEAGUE OF SAVINGS AND
LOANS, SAVINGS AND LOAN FAcr BOOK 1978, at 26.
90. Patton v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978).
91. Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725
(1972).
92. See J. HETLAND, SECURED REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS (1977).
93. 21 Cal. 3d at 954, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
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ment are strictly limited by federal regulation94 in that they
may not charge rates in excess of the prevailing market 5 This
idea is premised upon the notion that the marketplace should
be the guide to interest rates and it is not the place of the courts
to set up low cost real estate as a "property right". Rates,
instead, are a contract right granted to a borrower at arm's
length and not intended to be passed onto the subsequent pur-
chasers of the property." A lender may be willing to lend money
to some person at one rate of interest, but insist upon a higher
rate for other less desirable risks. This is not a lack of good faith
or fair dealing between borrowers and lenders, but is a justified
exercise of the lender's prerogatives. Applying Wellenkamp to
federal associations allows the courts to make a better contract
for the property seller and assuming purchaser than the mar-
ketplace would allow. 7
THE GLENDALE CASES AND A.B. 748
In People v. Glendale Federal Savings and Loan
94. See FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J., Apr. 1976. Lenders are limited under
the terms of 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(g)(3) (1979) (provision for written assumptions by
borrowers and waiver of due-on-sale clause by lender).
95. 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(d) (1979).
96. 44 LEGAL BULL. 370, 376 (Nov. 1978).
97. It is noteworthy that in the case of People v. Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, No. C 147921 (Super. Ct. L. A. County 1979), plaintiffs contended, and the court
agreed, that Wellenkamp would not provide an economic detriment to federal associa-
tions. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiff's motion for judgment pursuant to CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 631.8 (West 1979) on this issue. The text of the court's discussion
was as follows:
The Court finds that the impact of the imposition of Wellenkamp restric-
tions on the exercise of due-on-sale provisions in pre June 8, 1976 loan
contracts is insignificant, and that there is no discrimination.
Counsel have agreed that the test is whether or not the state restrictions
would "handicap or obstruct the operation of the Federal institution to
such extent that it could not carry out the intent of Congress." The
opinion of the expert as to the economic loss which would be suffered is
largely based on assumption and supposition. Even if accepted, the loss
of income to the Association would not be such that it would be prohib-
ited from carrying out the purpose of Congress. The burden must be
actual and not merely hypothetical. It is nothing more than a guess to
project that just because of the restrictions imposed by Wellenkamp the
funds represented by pre June 8, 1976 loans will be locked in and funds
will not be available to the association, but even accepting the figures
presented by defendant the impact would be insignificant. The purpose
for which Federal Savings and Loans were established is to provide assis-
tance and relief to homeowners, and neither that purpose nor any of the
subsequent purposes will be frustrated by the imposition of the Wellen-
kamp restriction on that portion of the loan portfolio consisting of pre
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Association,"5 filed in 1975 before the enactment of FHLBB's
section 545.6-11(f), (g) regulation governing due-on-sale, the
State of California sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the defendants, alleging that the defendant violated
Tucker v. Lassen Savings and Loan Association"' by accelerat-
ing repayment of a loan solely on the grounds that the debtor-
seller entered into an installment land-sale contract. This, the
State claimed, was done to unlawfully readjust the interest
rate. The defendant maintained that its exercise of the due-on
clause was valid, regardless of the Tucker violation, since fed-
eral law authorizes use of the clause by federal associations.
According to a minute order dated July 30, 1979, the Superior
Court, County of Los Angeles determined that plaintiff was
bound by judgment in Glendale v. Fox'0° under principles of
collateral estoppel.101 The court, however, expressed the opin-
ion that having found no mandate for national uniformity,
state law must be upheld, unless there is an actual conflict
between federal and state law so the two cannot stand in the
same area, or evidence is presented showing some congressional
design to preempt the field. 0
June 8, 1976 loans.
People v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. C 147921 (Super. Ct. L.A. County
1979) (minute order).
98. No. C 147921 (Super. Ct. L.A. County, filed 1975).
99. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974). See note 7 supra.
100. No. CV 77-3274-WMB (C.D. Cal. 1979)(final summary judgment).
101. The minute order read, in part:
This court has determined that plaintiff is bound by the judgment in
Glendale v. Fox . . . . The matter has been considered and the Court
finds that all of the requisites for the application of collateral estoppel
are present. Under federal law the decision is final; the issues are exactly
the same; and the parties are the same.
People v. Glendale, No. C-147921 (Super. Ct. L.A. County 1979)(minute order).
102. People v. Glendale, No. C-147921 (Super. Ct. L.A. County 1979)(minute
order). The court stated the opinion that loans made before the Bank Board's adoption
of 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f), (g) (1979) are governed by state law:
Prior to the adoption of the regulations effective June 8, 1976 Congress
through its agent Bank Board had made no attempt to specifically regu-
late the exercisability or validity of due-on-sale clauses. There was no
conflict and state law governs.
Retroactive application of the regulations would be unconstitutional and
they must be interpreted to apply only to loan contracts entered into after
June 8, 1976. The law of California governs the exercise of the right of
acceleration under all entered into on or before a [sic] that date.
Id.
See also Gallal v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. C 269537 (1979), where
the court applied Wellenkamp to a pre June 8, 1976 loan
because at the time of the execution of the loan instruments there was
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Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Fox
involved a California law' that required the Real Estate Com-
missioner's approval before a developer could sell or lease par-
cels of a subdivision. Glendale was dropped as the "take-out"
lender because, in the Commissioner's opinion, Glendale's
standardized note and deed of trust were illegal under Civil
Code section 2924.6. 10 Glendale filed suit August 30, 1977 seek-
ing, inter alia, a declaration that 12 C.F.R. section 545.6-11(0
and (g) preempted state law.
On June 21, 1979, the U.S. District Court entered a final
summary judgment in favor of Glendale and cross-claimant,
the Federal Home Loan Bank, pursuant to Rule 56(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The judgment held:
Federal law, including specifically 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f)
and (g), exclusively governs the validity and exercisability
of due-on-sale clauses in the loan instruments of federally-
no specific provision in the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 or any Federal
Home Loan Board regulation governing enforcement of the due-on-sale
clause and such loans are not preempted by any Federal law.
Id.
103. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11018 (West Supp. 1979).
104. Glendale was informed by the developer, in a letter authorized by the Com-
missioner of Real Estate, that its note and deed of trust did not conform with section
2924.6, which limits the exercisability of due-on clauses. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924.6 (West
Supp. 1979) states:
(a) An obligee may not accelerate the maturity date of the princi-
pal and accrued interest on any loan secured by a mortgage or deed of
trust on residential real property solely by reason of any one or more of
the following transfers in the title to the real property:
(1) A transfer resulting from the death of an obligor where
the transfer is to the spouse who is also an obligor.
(2) A transfer by an obligor where the spouse becomes a co-
owner of the property.
(3) A transfer resulting from a decree of dissolution of the
marriage or legal separation or from a property settlement agree-
ment incidental to such a decree which requires the obligor to
continue to make the loan payments by which a spouse who is an
obligor becomes the sole owner of the property.
(4) A transfer by an obligor or obligors into an inter vivos
trust in which the obligor or obligors are beneficiaries.
(5) Such real property or any portion thereof is made subject
to a junior encumbrance or lien.
(b) Any waiver of the provisions of this section by an obligor is void
and unenforceable and is contrary to public policy.
(c) For the purposes of this section, "residential real property"
means any real property which contains at least one but not more than
four units.
(d) This act applies only to loans executed or refinanced on or after
January 1, 1976.
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chartered savings and loan associations executed after
June 8, 1976. California law on the validity and exercisa-
bility of due-on-sale clauses does not apply to such loan
instruments.5
The court found that no genuine issues of material fact re-
mained, and that the state's affirmative defenses were without
merit.
In its judgment, the court noted, as did the superior court
in the state case, that although both cases had a different fac-
tual genesis, they involved the same controversy-federal
preemption. Noting that mere pendency of a concurrent pro-
ceeding in state court does not automatically dismiss a federal
action, the court, realizing the possibility of duplicative and
conflicting decisions, nevertheless held that:
Both parties, however, have a substantial interest in hav-
ing the issues presented by this action resolved [citation
omitted], and the federal court appears to have reached
such a resolution with more deliberate speed than the state
court. 08
Assembly Bill 748
There has been one final development in the Wellenkamp
controversy: the introduction of Assembly Bill 748 on March 5,
1979.117 AB 748 offered residential borrowers on one to four unit
105. No. CV 77-3274-WMB, at 2.
106. Id. at 26.
107. A.B. 748, CAL. LEGIS. 1979-1980 Reg. Sess. states in pertinent
part:
(a) A provision in a mortgage or deed of trust on residential or
nonresidential real property permitting the mortgagee or beneficiary to
accelerate the maturity date of the principal and accrued interest on a
loan or other obligation secured by such mortgage or deed of trust upon
a transfer of legal or equitable title to such real property, whether by
deed, contract of sale, or otherwise, is not a condition restraining aliena-
tion or a restraint against alienation under Section 711, and is valid and
enforceable, provided that, if the mortgage or deed of trust is on residen-
tial real property and secures a loan made by an institutional lender, the
loan obligor was offered before consummation of the loan the choice be-
tween such loan and a comparable loan secured by a mortgage or deed
of trust that excludes such acceleration provision. For purposes of this
section, such choice may be offered subject to reasonable distinctions in
terms (including, without limitation, the rate of interest and period of
repayment) between loans made with an acceleration provision and loans
made without such a provision.
(b) For purposes of this section, a difference in interest rate not exceeding
1 percent per annum and a variation in period of repayment of not more
than five years shall be deemed to be reasonable distinctions in terms.
[Vol. 20
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dwellings, a choice between two mortgage instruments-one
that contains a due-on-sale clause (non-assumable), and one
that does not contain such a clause (assumable). The exercise
of the option would be subject to "reasonable distinctions in
terms (including, without limitation, the rate of interest and
period of payment)."' ' The bill, however, specifies that the
difference in interest may not exceed "1 percent per annum
and a variation in period of repayment of not more than five
years . ... 01
The California Savings and Loan League analyzed the bill
as follows:
Under AB 748, the lender could charge a higher interest
rate to those borrowers wishing the assumable loan, and
require a shorter length of the life of the mortgage. Thus,
a consumer who believes that mortgage rates will perma-
nently rise and wants to take advantage of that fact when
he sells his home would pay a premium for the ability to
offer his fixed rate to a new buyer. The consumer who is
only interested in the guaranteed mortgage rate for the
period of time he owns his home, and does not want to
speculate on the future mortgage rates and their potential
advantage in selling his house, would pay a lower interest
rate for his non-assumable mortgage (i.e., allowing finan-
cial institutions to adjust the interest rate to the new buyer
according to existing market rates)."10
AB 748, however, failed to muster enough votes to pass
the California Assembly. Thus, the Glendale v. Fox case
remains dispositive of the issue of Wellenkamp's applicability
to federal associations.
CONCLUSION
Pending an appeal of Glendale v. Fox, it appears that
federal associations are free to exercise due-on-sale clauses in
their deeds of trust (at least with respect to those instruments
executed after June 8, 1976)."' The full effect of this bifurcated
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Memo. to Editor from California Savings and Loan League (June 1, 1979)
(emphasis in original)(on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
111. For instance, some federal associations will start foreclosure proceedings if
a buyer refuses to assume at a higher rate. Others attempt to exact various charges,
points, or fees for assumption. And still others are accepting "Reservation of Rights
Agreements." This latter arrangement between the new buyer and the lender, allows
the buyer to take ownership and make payments on the assumed loan without threat
19801
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system created by Wellenkamp remains to be seen. Another
open question is whether or not legislation addressing the
Wellenkamp issue will arise again, given the two powerful in-
terest groups involved-the real estate and savings and loan
industries.
This comment advocates the need for uniformity in com-
pliance with the intent of Congress expressed in the Home
Owner's Loan Act. The Glendale summary judgment reflects
this view. Without such national uniformity, we would take a
step backward, allowing diverse state policies to govern as they
did prior to the passage of HOLA.
The need for a healthy home-loan industry in the United
States was a lesson well-learned in the Great Depression. The
Federal Home Loan Bank Board's promulgation of 12 C.F.R.
section 545.6-11(f) and (g), and its insistence on federal
preemption, seeks to further this goal by retaining the due-on-
sale clause as a valid interest rate adjuster.
The Glendale cases serve as excellent fora for clear resolu-
tion of the potential issues that Wellenkamp and the preemp-
tion doctrine present. The State of California and the federal
government will most likely bring all their resources to bear on
a denouement to these issues, especially in light of
Wellenkamp's tremendous impact on the important real estate
and home mortgage markets.
Kirk A. Musacchio
of foreclosure or litigation, pending the final disposition of the Glendale cases. The
rights of neither party are waived, until this disposition. Seminar by Fred Crane, supra
note 4.
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